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GAMBLE V. UNITED STATES: THE DUAL 
SOVEREIGNTY DOCTRINE UNDER THE 
NATIONAL VS. INTERNATIONALIZED CONTEXT 
– WHAT IS SOVEREIGN TO ONE IS NOT 
SOVEREIGN TO THE OTHER 
VERONICA MINA†  
In Gamble v. United States,1 the Supreme Court addressed 
whether to overrule a longstanding interpretation of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which provides that no 
person may be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.2  The 
Court adhered to longstanding precedent and held that a crime under 
one sovereign’s laws is not “the same offense” as a crime under the 
laws of another sovereign.3  The Court incorrectly held that the “dual-
sovereignty” doctrine was constitutional in the United States, where a 
state may prosecute a defendant under state law even if the federal 
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 1. 139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 3. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1963.  
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government already prosecuted him for the same conduct under a 
federal statute, or vice versa because the state government is not 
sovereign.4  Additionally, the Court incorrectly explained that “dual 
sovereignty” analogously applies in the international context as it 
does in the United States domestic context because the Court 
misplaced the views and roles of jurisdiction and sovereignty in 
international law for purposes of prosecution.5 
I. THE CASE 
In November 2015, a police officer in Mobile, Alabama pulled 
Terance Gamble over for a damaged headlight.6  The police officer 
smelled marijuana so he searched Gamble’s car, where he found a 
loaded 9-mm handgun.7  Gamble was previously convicted of 
second-degree robbery.  Therefore, his possession of the handgun 
violated an Alabama law providing that no one convicted of “a crime 
of violence”8 “shall own a firearm or have one in his or her 
possession.”9  Gamble pleaded guilty to the possession of a handgun 
in violation of Alabama law.  Afterward, federal prosecutors indicted 
him for the same instance of possession under a federal law.10  The 
federal law forbade those convicted of “a crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to ship or transport 
in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting 
commerce, any firearm or ammunition.”11 
Gamble moved to dismiss the federal indictment on the ground 
that it was for “the same offense” as the one at issue in his state 
conviction and thus exposed him to double jeopardy.12  The District 
Court denied Gamble’s motion to dismiss.13  Gamble then pleaded 
guilty to the federal offense while preserving his right to challenge 
 
 4. See infra Section IV.A. 
 5. See infra Section IV.B. 
 6. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1963. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-70(2) (2015) (defining “crime of violence” to include 
robbery). 
 9. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1964 (citing ALA. CODE § 13A-11-72(a) (2015)). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)). 
 12. Id. 
 13. See United States v. Gamble, No. 16-00090-KD-B, 2016 WL 3460414 (S.D. Ala. 
June 21, 2016) (explaining that we have here two sovereignties, deriving power from 
different sources . . . It follows that an act denounced as a crime by both national and state 
sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of both and may be punished by 
each (citing United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922))). 
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the denial of his motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds.14  On 
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.15  Gamble appealed to the 
Supreme Court, which granted Gamble’s petition for certiorari to 
determine whether to overturn the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine.16 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Double Jeopardy Clause in the Fifth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution prevents persons from being put in 
jeopardy of prosecution twice for substantially the same crime.17  The 
relevant part of the Fifth Amendment states, “No person shall . . . be 
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb 
. . . .”18  Section II.A discusses the elements of the Dual Jeopardy 
Clause and its general applicability.19  Section II.B discusses the 
purpose and origin of the Fifth Amendment through doctrinal 
applications.20  Section II.C examines jurisdiction as a prior constraint 
to exercising sovereignty.21  Section II.D examines the Dual 
Sovereignty Doctrine.22 
A. The Elements of the Double Jeopardy Clause and its 
Applicability 
The bar against double jeopardy applies if three elements are 
met.  The first two elements determine “former” jeopardy, which is a 
prerequisite to “double” jeopardy.23  When “former” jeopardy is 
assumed or established, the third element determines “double” 
jeopardy.24  First, jeopardy had previously attached.25  Second, 
 
 14. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1964. 
 15. See United States v. Gamble, 694 F. App’x 750, 751 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) 
(explaining that “the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent different sovereigns (i.e., a 
state government and the federal government) from punishing a defendant for the same 
criminal conduct” (citing United States v. Bidwell, 393 F.3d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 2004))). 
 16. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1964. 
 17. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 19. See infra Section II.A. 
 20. See infra Section II.B. 
 21. See infra Section II.C. 
 22. See infra Section II.D. 
 23. State v. Corrado, 81 Wash. App. 640, 645 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Serfass v. 
United States, 420 U.S. 377, 393 (1975) (explaining that an accused must suffer jeopardy 
before he can suffer double jeopardy)). 
 24. Id. 
 25. State v. Goldsmith, 147 Wash. App. 317, 323 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. 
Corrado, 81 Wash. App. 640, 645 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996)). 
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jeopardy is terminated.26  Third, the defendant is placed in jeopardy 
again for the same offense.27 
The first element requires that jeopardy previously attached.28  In 
order for jeopardy to attach, a defendant must risk a determination of 
guilt.29  A plea of double jeopardy requires that the accused must 
have been put in jeopardy.30  For example, a preliminary hearing 
before a magistrate to determine whether there is sufficient evidence 
to hold an accused for an action is not a trial.31  Therefore, the 
accused is not put in jeopardy and his or her discharge as a result of 
such a hearing does not bar a subsequent prosecution for the offense 
that gave rise to the preliminary hearing.32  Additionally, a showing 
of unfairness alone cannot invoke double jeopardy protection.33  The 
rule of double jeopardy is applicable only when the first prosecution 
involves a trial before a criminal court or at least a court empowered 
to impose punishment by way of fine, imprisonment, or otherwise as 
a deterrent to the commission of a crime.34  Therefore, administrative 
penalties, such as non-criminal lawyer disciplinary proceedings35 and 
the suspension of a driver’s license,36 do not constitute criminal 
sanctions or “punishment,” and double jeopardy does not bar further 
proceedings.37  The second element requires that jeopardy is 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See supra note 25. 
 29. Odem v. State, 175 Md. App. 684, 700 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007) (citing Serfass v. 
United States, 420 U.S. 377, 392 (1975) (stating “[A] defendant does not risk a 
determination of guilt when a trial court determines a preliminary matter without reaching 
the merits of the case.”)). 
 30. Wampler v. Warden of Md. Penitentiary, 231 Md. 639, 647–48 (Md. 1963). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Lloyd v. State, 42 Md. App. 167, 172 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (rebutting 
defendant’s argument that since one of the policies behind the double jeopardy concept is 
that the government act with fundamental fairness, we should find that he has been placed in 
double jeopardy if we find he has been treated unfairly). 
 34. In re John P., 311 Md. 700, 708 (Md. 1988) (“When no sanctions of a criminal 
nature are sought by the State in either the first or the second proceeding, it would seem that 
the double jeopardy prohibition is inapplicable.”). 
 35. Md. State Bar Ass’n, Inc. v. Frank, 272 Md. 528, 535 (Md. 1974) (explaining that 
the principles of double jeopardy or res judicata are no bar to a disciplinary proceeding 
which follows the disposition of a criminal indictment, though based on substantially the 
same conduct). 
 36. State v. Jones, 340 Md. 235, 265 (Md. 1995) (explaining that the remedial purpose 
of maintaining safety on the public highways amply justifies the maximum 45-day license 
suspension that the statute may impose upon a driver who fails blood or breath alcohol test, 
so that suspension does not constitute “punishment” and driver subsequently may be 
convicted of driving while intoxicated without violating double jeopardy principles). 
 37. See also Ward v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Serv., 339 Md. 343, 350 (Md. 1995) 
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previously terminated.38  The Double Jeopardy Clause applies only if 
there has been some event, such as an acquittal, which terminates the 
original jeopardy.39  The Supreme Court has held that the failure of 
the jury to reach a verdict, such as in the case of a hung jury or a 
mistrial, is not an event which terminates jeopardy.40 
In further determining whether the Double Jeopardy Clause of 
the Federal Constitution applies, two questions must be resolved: 
first, whether both tribunals before which the defendant was tried 
derived their authority and jurisdiction from the same sovereign, and 
second, whether both prosecutions were for the same offense.41  The 
express prohibition of double jeopardy for the same offense means 
that wherever such prohibition is applicable, either by operation of 
the Constitution or by action of Congress, no person shall be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb for the same offense.42 
First, if a person is tried for an offense in a tribunal deriving its 
jurisdiction and authority from the United States, and is acquitted or 
convicted, he cannot again be tried for the same offense in another 
tribunal deriving its jurisdiction and authority from the United 
States.43  Second, the same acts constituting a crime against the 
United States cannot, after the acquittal or conviction of the accused 
in a court of competent jurisdiction, be made the basis of a second 
trial of the accused for that crime in the same or in another court, 
civil or military, of the same government.44  However, the United 
States Supreme Court in Grafton v. United States45 acquiesced to the 
principle that an offense against the United States can only be 
punished under its authority and in the tribunals created by its laws; 
whereas, an offense against a state can be punished only by its 
authority and in its tribunals.46  The same act may constitute two 
 
(holding that disciplinary sanctions imposed on correctional employees under Division of 
Correction regulations are remedial in nature, not punitive, and thus, the Double Jeopardy 
Clause does not apply). 
 38. See supra note 26. 
 39. Richardson v. U.S., 468 U.S. 317, 325 (1984). 
 40. Id. at 325-26 (explaining that the “ends of justice would otherwise be defeated,” as 
the government, like the defendant, is entitled to resolution of the case by verdict from the 
jury, and jeopardy does not terminate when the jury is discharged because it is unable to 
agree). 
 41. United States v. Vaughan, 491 F.2d 1096, 1097 (5th Cir. 1974) (citing Harlow v. 
United States, 301 F.2d 361, 373–74 (5th Cir. 1962)). 
 42. Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 351–52 (1907). 
 43. Id. at 352. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 354. 
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offenses, one against the United States and the other against a state.47 
B. Understanding the Purpose and Origin of the Fifth 
Amendment Through A Doctrinal View of The Double 
Jeopardy Clause 
Notwithstanding the doctrinal history, the history that led to the 
inception of the Double Jeopardy Clause is important.48  The Senate 
favored adopting the traditional language, ‘jeopardy,’ which was 
adopted by the Conference Committee and approved by both Houses 
with no apparent dissension.”49  The idea of double jeopardy has its 
origins in a lengthy common-law history, specifically through ancient 
Greek and Roman laws.50  In the 17th century, Lord Coke described 
the protection afforded by the principle of double jeopardy as a 
function of three related common-law pleas: autrefois acquit (already 
acquitted of the same offense), autrefois convict (already convicted of 
the same offense), and pardon.51  With some exceptions, these pleas 
could be raised to bar the second trial of a defendant if he could prove 
that he had already been convicted of the same crime.52  Blackstone 
later used the ancient term “jeopardy” in characterizing the principle 
underlying the two pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict.53  
He wrote that “jeopardy” signified a “universal maxim of the 
common law of England, that no man is to be brought into jeopardy 
of his life more than once for the same offense.”54  The principle of 
double jeopardy is often referred by its Latin name, non bis in idem 
or ne bis in idem – “not twice for the same thing,”55 deriving from the 
Roman maxim nemo bis vexari pro una et eadam causa, “no man 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 340–42 (1975) (“At the time of the first 
Congress, only one state had a constitutional provision embodying anything resembling a 
prohibition against double jeopardy.  In the course of their ratification proceedings, however, 
two other States suggested that a double jeopardy clause be included among the first 
amendments to the Federal Constitution.  Apparently attempting to accommodate these 
suggestions, James Madison added a ban against double jeopardy to the proposed version of 
the Bill of Rights that he presented to the House of Representatives in June 1789.  Madison’s 
provision read: ‘No person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to more than 
one punishment or one trial for the same offense.’” (citing 1 Annals of Cong. 434 (1789))). 
 49. S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess., 71, 77, 87–88 (1820); H.R. JOUR. 1st Cong., 1st 
Sess., 121 (1826). 
 50. Wilson, 420 U.S. at 340. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. (citing 3 E. Coke, Institutes 212–13 (6th ed. 1680)). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. (citing 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *335–36). 
 55. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). 
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shall be twice vexed or tried for the same cause.”56 
After the Double Jeopardy clause was adopted, its doctrinal 
application refined its purpose and meaning further.  The Supreme 
Court first considered the Fifth Amendment’s “twice put in jeopardy” 
clause in Respublica v. Shaffer.57  The Court explained that by 
questioning the competency of a court’s verdict or a unanimous jury 
verdict, the judicial system would necessarily introduce the 
oppression of a double trial.58 
Several decades later, the Supreme Court continued to uphold 
the Double Jeopardy Clause in Ex parte Lange.59  The Court 
emphasized that, “[i]f there is anything settled in the jurisprudence of 
England and America, it is that no man can be twice lawfully 
punished for the same offense.”60  In examining the purpose of the 
Fifth Amendment, the Court explained that, “For of what avail is the 
constitutional protection against more than one trial if there can be 
any number of sentences pronounced on the same verdict?”61  Justice 
Miller further explained that the issue is not the danger or jeopardy of 
being found guilty a second time, but rather it is the punishment that 
would legally follow the second conviction which is the real danger 
guarded against by the Constitution.62 
 
 56. See Gerard Conway, Ne bis in Idem in International Law, 3 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 217 
(2003). 
 57. 1 U.S. 236 (Pa. Ct. of Oyer & Terminer, 1788). 
 58. Id. at 236–37 (“It is a matter well known, and well understood, that by the laws of 
our country, every question which affects a man’s life, reputation, or property, must be tried 
by twelve of his peers; and that their unanimous verdict is, alone, competent to determine the 
fact in issue.  If them, you undertake to enquire, not only upon what foundation the charge is 
made, but, likewise, upon what foundation it is denied, you will, in effect, usurp the 
jurisdiction of the Petty Jury, you will supersede the legal authority of the court, in judging 
of the competency and admissibility of witnesses, and, having thus undertaken to try the 
question, that question may be determined by a bare majority, or by a much greater number 
of your body, than the twelve peers described by the law of the land.”). 
 59. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163 (1873). 
 60. Id. at 164, 168 (“The principle finds expression in more than one form in the 
maxims of the common law.  In civil cases the doctrine is expressed by the maxim that no 
man shall be twice vexed for one and the same cause.  Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et 
eadem causa. It is upon the foundation of this maxim that the plea of a former judgment for 
the same matter, whether it be in favor of the defendant or against him, is a good bar to an 
action.”); see also Crenshaw v. The State of Tennessee, 8 Tenn. 122 (Mart. & Yer. 1827) 
(holding that a conviction, judgment, and execution upon one indictment for a felony not 
capital is a bar to all other indictments for felonies not capital, committed previous to such 
conviction, judgment, and execution). 
 61. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. at 173. 
 62. Id. But see Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1986) (“The prohibition is not 
against being twice punished, but against being twice put in jeopardy; and the accused, 
whether convicted or acquitted, is equally put in jeopardy at the first trial.”). 
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Additionally, the purpose of the Fifth Amendment represents a 
constitutional policy of finality for the defendant’s benefit in federal 
criminal proceedings.63  In United States v. Jorn,64 the defendant was 
prosecuted for willfully assisting in the preparation of false and 
fraudulent tax returns for a taxpayer.65  The Supreme Court opposed 
allowing the government to subject the individual to repeated 
prosecutions for the same offense, as this would cut deeply into the 
framework of procedural protections that the Constitution establishes 
for the conduct of a criminal trial.66  The Court took the stance that 
the policy underlying the Fifth Amendment is to save individuals 
from embarrassment, expense, ordeal, and a continuous state of 
anxiety.67 
C. Jurisdiction as a Prior Issue to Exercising Sovereignty 
The concept of sovereignty relies on the understanding of proper 
jurisdiction.  “Sovereignty,” for double jeopardy purposes, means the 
legal concept of jurisdiction – specifically, independent jurisdiction 
to prescribe, or to make and apply, law.  This prescriptive jurisdiction 
in turn authorizes independent jurisdiction to enforce that law 
through a separate prosecution.  Exercise of independent jurisdiction 
by either federal or state government must satisfy due process under 
the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.68 
A state’s exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction must satisfy 
constitutional tests that consider, among other things, the degree of 
contacts between the forum, the parties and the occurrence,69 the 
interests of the forum,70 and the reasonable expectations of the 
 
 63. See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971). 
 64. 400 U.S. 470 (1971). 
 65. Id. at 470. 
 66. Id. at 479 (explaining that society’s awareness of the heavy personal strain that a 
criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit 
the government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in 
enforcement of criminal laws). 
 67. Id. (“The state with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make 
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting the 
person to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal, and compelling the person to live in a 
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even 
though innocent the person may be found guilty.”). 
 68. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 69. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 334 (1981); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985). 
 70. Hague, 449 U.S. at 318. 
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parties,71 in order both to protect defendants and to ensure that states 
“do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status 
as coequal sovereigns.”72  Other relevant factors include the efficient 
resolution of controversies, orderly administration of law, and shared 
substantive policies within a system of multiple sovereigns.73 
At its root, jurisdiction means, “the speaking of law.”74  The key 
to ascertaining dual sovereigns “turns on whether the two prosecuting 
entities draw their authority to punish the offender from distinct 
sources of power.”75  Framed in the Supreme Court’s dual 
sovereignty language, prescriptive jurisdiction represents (1) the 
power “to determine what shall be an offense,”76 and adjudicative and 
enforcement jurisdiction represents; and (2) the power “to punish 
such offenses.”77  Where an entity has an independent prescriptive 
jurisdiction, it is functionally a “sovereign” as envisaged by the dual 
sovereignty doctrine – it independently may determine what shall be 
an offense, and may marshal its adjudicative and enforcement 
jurisdiction to punish that offense.78  Since the state government and 
the federal government – as distinct lawgivers – enjoy distinct 
prescriptive jurisdictions to make and apply distinct laws, distinct 
prosecutions would be permissible.  However, this concept of 
jurisdiction becomes significantly more complicated in the 
international sphere.79 
D. The Dual Sovereignty Doctrine: Application of the 
Blockburger Test 
To determine whether the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine applies, 
the courts look at the elements of each statute, where each of the 
offenses require proof of a different element.80  The applicable rule is 
as follows—where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation 
of two distinct statutory provisions, the court looks to the difference 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 334 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292–94 (1980)). 
 73. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980); Asahi 
Metal Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113–15 (1987). 
 74. Costas Douzinas, The Metaphysics of Jurisdiction, in JURISPRUDENCE OF 
JURISDICTION 22 (Shaun McVeigh ed., 2007). 
 75. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985); see infra Section IV.A. 
 76. Heath, 474 U.S. at 89–90. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See infra Section IV.B. 
 80. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). 
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between the two statutes as it pertains to the pertinent facts.81  The 
test is not whether the defendant has already been tried for the same 
act, but whether he has been put in jeopardy for the same offense.82  
An offense is determined by the applicability of the underlying law.83 
The first true full application of the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine 
in the United States was in 1922 in United States v. Lanza.84  In 
violation of the National Prohibition Act, the defendants were 
charged with manufacturing intoxicating liquor, the second with 
transporting it, and the third with possessing it.85  The State of 
Washington turned around and charged the same defendants with 
manufacturing, transporting, and having in possession the same 
liquor under its own state statute.86  The defendants claimed that the 
two punishments for the same act constitute double jeopardy under 
the Fifth Amendment.87 
In dismissing the defendants’ claims, the Supreme Court 
explained that in determining what is an offense against its peace and 
dignity, each government exercises its own sovereignty, not that of 
the other.88  Furthermore, the Court emphasized that an act denounced 
as a crime by both national and state sovereignties is an offense 
against the peace and dignity of both and therefore may be punished 
by both.89  In the case of Lanza, the same act was an offense against 
the state of Washington, because the offense violated one of its state 
laws, and also an offense against the United States under the National 
Prohibition Act.90  Thus, the Court held that the defendants 
committed two different offenses by the same act, and a conviction 
by a Washington court against the state is not a conviction of the 
different offense against the United States, and so is not double 
jeopardy.91  In the first true application of the dual sovereignty 
 
 81. Id. at 304 (citing Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911)); see also 
Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433 (Mass. 1871) (“A single act may be an offense 
against two statutes; and if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other 
does not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from 
prosecution and punishment under the other.”). 
 82. Morey, 108 Mass. at 434. 
 83. See supra note 82. 
 84. 260 U.S. 377 (1922). 
 85. Id. at 378–79. 
 86. Id. at 379. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 382. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
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doctrine, the Court explicitly employed the concept of jurisdiction – 
and, more specifically, independent prescriptive jurisdiction to 
determine offenses – to justify its holding.92 
III. THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Gamble v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed 
whether a State in the United States may prosecute a defendant under 
state law even if the Federal Government prosecuted him for the 
same conduct under a federal statute, or vice versa.93  Writing for the 
majority, Justice Alito affirmed the Eleventh Circuit’s decision that 
double jeopardy did not prohibit the federal government from 
prosecuting Gamble for the same conduct that the State of Alabama 
prosecuted him for, and thus upheld the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine.94  
He explained that under the principles of stare decisis,95 the Clause’s 
text coupled with 170 years of precedent and other historical 
evidence, did not persuade the Court to overturn that precedent.96  
The Court began its analysis by examining the language of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause and acquiescing to the notion that there are 
two sovereigns in the United States – the federal sovereign and each 
state sovereign.97  Justice Alito clarified that the language of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause protects individuals from being twice put in 
jeopardy “‘for the same offense,’ not for the same conduct or 
actions.”98  By clarifying the language of the Clause, Justice Alito 
explained that, as the term was originally understood, a law defines 
an “offense,” and a sovereign defines each law.99  Therefore, where 
 
 92. Id. (“We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different sources, 
capable of dealing with the same subject matter within the same territory.  Each may, 
without interference by the other, enact laws to secure prohibition, with the limitation that no 
legislation can give validity to acts prohibited by the amendment.”). 
 93. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1963–64 (2019). 
 94. Id. at 1964; See United States v. Gamble, 694 F. App’x. 750, 751 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 95. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1981 (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that the Court 
currently views stare decisis as a “‘principle of policy’” that balances several factors to 
decide whether the scales tip in favor of overruling precedent (citing Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 363 (2010))); see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 
U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (“Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the 
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on 
judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial 
process.”). 
 96. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1969 (majority opinion). 
 97. Id. at 1966. 
 98. Id. at 1965 (citing Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 529 (1990)). 
 99. Id. (citing Grady, 495 U.S. at 529 (Scalia J., dissenting) (“If the same conduct 
violates two or more laws, then each offense may be separately prosecuted.”)); see Moore v. 
Illinois, 55 U.S. 13, 17 (1852) (“The constitutional provision is not, that no person shall be 
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there are two sovereigns, there are two laws, and two “offenses.”100 
Then the Supreme Court discussed the interests each sovereign 
has in punishing the same act.101  For instance, an assault on a United 
States marshal would offend the Nation and a state – the Nation by 
hindering the execution of legal process, and the state by breaching 
the peace of the State.102  Justice Alito cited additional support from 
the international sphere to emphasize the interests that separate 
sovereigns have in punishing conduct which violates each 
sovereign’s own laws.103  In the majority’s view, if a United States 
national was murdered in another country, that country could 
rightfully seek to punish the killer for committing an act of violence 
within its territory.104  Additionally, the United States looks at the 
same conduct and sees an act of violence against one of its nationals, 
a person under the particular protection of its laws.105  Therefore, in 
Justice Alito’s view, customary international law allows exercise of 
jurisdiction permitting prosecution in American courts for the killing 
of an American abroad.106  Moreover, Justice Alito recognized that 
that Americans may lack confidence in the competency or honesty of 
foreign legal systems, or less cynically, Americans may think that 
special protection for United States nationals serves key national 
interests related to security, trade, commerce, or scholarship.107 
While the majority acquiesces to the fact that “the Republic is 
‘one whole,’”108 it makes a distinction between “the whole” and a 
single part.109  Holdings like McCulloch v. Maryland, asserting that a 
 
subject, for the same act, to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; but for the same offense, 
the same violation of law, no person’s life or limb shall be twice put in jeopardy.”). 
 100. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1965. 
 101. Id. at 1966 (explaining that the Double Jeopardy Clause does more than honor the 
formal difference between two distinct criminal codes, it honors the substantive differences 
between the interests that two sovereigns can have in punishing the same act). 
 102. Id. at 1966–67 (reasoning that the duality of harm explains how ‘one act’ could 
constitute “two offenses, for each of which the offender is justly punishable”). 
 103. See supra note 102. 
 104. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1967 (explaining that the foreign country’s interest lies in 
protecting the peace in that territory rather than protecting the American specifically). 
 105. Id. (“The murder of a U.S. national is an offense to the United States as much as it is 
to the country where the murder occurred and to which the victim is a stranger.”). 
 106. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2332(a)(1)). 
 107. Id. (recognizing that such interests might also give us a stake in punishing crimes 
committed by United States nationals abroad – especially crimes that might do harm to our 
national security or foreign relations); see, e.g., § 2332a(b). 
 108. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1968 (citing Ginsburg, J., dissenting, at 1990). 
 109. Id. at 1968 (majority opinion) (noting that in McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall 
distinguished precisely between “the people of a State: and “the people of all States;” 
between the “sovereignty which the people of a single state possess” and the sovereign 
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state may not tax the national bank, recognize that states and the 
Nation have different “interests” and “rights.”110  Although the 
American Constitution rests on the principle that the people are 
sovereign, Justice Alito argues that does not mean that the people 
have conferred all the attributes of sovereignty on a single 
government.111  In fact, when the original States declared their 
independence, the Constitution limited but did not abolish the 
sovereign powers of the States, which retained “a residuary and 
inviolable sovereignty.”112  Therefore, according to the majority, 
because the Federal Government and the States wield sovereign 
powers, the American system of government is one of “dual 
sovereignty.”113 
In rebutting the dissent’s opinion that the division of federal and 
state power was meant to promote liberty and thus not expose 
Gamble to a second sentence,114 Justice Alito emphasizes that because 
the powers of the Federal and State government often overlap, there 
are two layers of regulation.115  Similarly, it is not uncommon for the 
Federal Government to permit activities that a State chooses to forbid 
or heavily restrict, such as gambling and selling alcohol.116  
Therefore, while the majority agrees that the system of federalism is 
fundamental to the protection of liberty, the system does not always 
maximize individual liberty at the expense of other interests.117  
Justice Alito ultimately ends his opinion explaining that an “offense” 
for double jeopardy purposes is defined by statutory elements, not by 
what might be described in a looser sense as a unit of criminal 
conduct.118  Consequentially, eliminating the dual-sovereignty rule 
would do little to trim the reach of federal criminal law, and it would 
not even prevent many successive state and federal prosecutions for 
the same criminal conduct unless the system for defining an 
 
powers “conferred by the people of the United States on the government of the Union;” and 
between “the action of a part” and “the action of the whole” (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 
4 Wheat. 316, 428–36 (1819))). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. (explaining that the people, by adopting the Constitution, “split the atom of 
sovereignty” (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751 (1999))). 
 112. Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, 245 (James Madison)). 
 113. Id. (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991)). 
 114. Id. at 1990-91 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Id. at 1999–2000 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 115. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1968-69 (majority opinion). The majority indicates that 
taxation is an example that comes immediately to mind. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 1969. 
 118. Id. at 1980 (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932)). 
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“offense” under double jeopardy was overruled.119 
In the dissent, Justice Ginsburg notes that garnering support 
from the international sphere is irrelevant in the case at hand because 
Gamble was convicted in both Alabama and the United States, 
jurisdictions that are not foreign to each other.120  While the majority 
relies on precedent that spans as far back as 1922,121 Justice Ginsburg 
urges the majority to stay away from, in her opinion, such “ill-
advised” decisions.122  Under her rationale, the United States and its 
constituent States, unlike foreign nations, are “kindred systems,” 
“parts of ONE WHOLE.”123  She explains that the United States and 
its constituent States compose one people, bound by an overriding 
Federal Constitution.124  Therefore, the Federal and State 
Governments should be restricted from accomplishing together “what 
neither government could do alone—prosecute an ordinary citizen 
twice for the same offense.”125 
Then, Justice Ginsburg emphasized that the Dual Sovereignty 
Doctrine treats governments as sovereign, whereas, in the system 
established by the Federal Constitution, “ultimate sovereignty” 
resides in the governed.126  In contrast to Justice Alito’s argument that 
the system of dual sovereignty allows separate sovereigns to each 
have their own offense,127 Justice Ginsburg explains that the division 
of authority between the United States and the States was intended to 
operate as “a double security for the rights of the people,” not as a 
mechanism to take away people’s rights.128  For Justice Ginsburg, the 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 1990 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 121. See United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922). 
 122. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1990 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 123. Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, 493 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. (citing Amar & Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney King, 95 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 2 (1995)). 
 126. Id. (citing Arizona State Leg. v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 139 S. Ct. 
2652, 2675 (2015); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 324–35 (1816)). 
 127. See supra note 100.  (NOTE 100 IS JUST A CITATION TO GAMBLE. IS THIS 
WHAT YOU ARE TRYING TO CROSS REFERENCE? DO YOU MEAN TEXT 
ACCOMPANYING NOTE 100?) Veronica’s Response: I was citing to FN 100 because the 
citation to Gamble in FN 100 is what I’m referencing. If it makes it easier, I am okay with 
just having this FN read: Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1965. (NOTE: That change would make the 
following footnote (128) just read: Id. at 1991 ... etc.). 
 128. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1991 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing The Federalist No. 51, 
323 (James Madison)); see Id. at 1994 (explaining that the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine 
provides new opportunities for federal and state prosecutors to “join together to take a 
second bite at the apple” (citing United States v. All Assets of G.P.S. Automotive, 66 F.3d 
483, 498 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring))). 
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Double Jeopardy Clause embodies a principle that is deeply 
engrained in our system of justice.129  Lastly, Justice Ginsburg 
explains that overruling the separate-sovereign doctrine would not 
affect large numbers of cases.130 
In a separate dissent, Justice Gorsuch argues that a free society 
does not allow its government to try the same individual for the same 
crime until it is happy with the punishment.131  In support of this 
argument, Justice Gorsuch uses textualist132 and originalist 
arguments.133  Textually, although the Double Jeopardy Clause is 
silent about allowing “separate sovereigns” to sequentially do what 
neither may do separately, the government assures the people that the 
Fifth Amendment’s phrase “same offense” does this work.134  In an 
originalist view, Justice Gorsuch argues that the government does not 
identify any evidence suggesting that the framers understood the term 
“same offense” to bear such a lawyerly sovereign-specific meaning.135  
The Constitution as originally adopted and understood did not allow 
successive state and federal prosecutions for the same offense.136  In 
Justice Gorsuch’s opinion, trying to explain the Court’s separate 
sovereign rule to a criminal defendant, then or now, would be 
absolutely absurd.137  Justice Gorsuch agrees with Justice Ginsburg, 
 
 129. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1991 (“[T]hat the State with all its resources and power should 
not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, 
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in 
a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even 
though innocent he may be found guilty.” (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 
187–88 (1957))). 
 130. Id. at 1995 (“Under the Petite policy adopted by the Department of Justice, the 
Department will pursue a federal prosecution “based on substantially the same act(s) or 
transaction(s)” previously prosecuted in state court only if the first prosecution left a 
“substantial federal interest . . . demonstrably un-vindicated” and a Department senior 
official authorizes the prosecution.” (quoting Dept. of Justice, Justice Manual § 9-2.031(A) 
(rev. July 2009))). 
 131. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1996. 
 132. Id. at 1997 (explaining that two statutes can punish the same offense); see U.S. 
CONST. amend. V. 
 133. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1997.  
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 1998. 
 136. Id. at 2005. 
 137. Id. at 1999. Specifically, Justice Gorsuch states that one would have to explain the 
following to a criminal defendant: yes, you were sentenced to state prison for being a felon 
in possession of a firearm.  And don’t worry – the State can’t prosecute you again for exactly 
the same thing.  What’s more, that federal prosecutor may work hand-in-hand with the same 
state prosecutor who already went after you.  They can share evidence and discuss what 
worked and what didn’t the first time around.  And the federal prosecutor can pursue you 
even if you were acquitted in the state case.  None of that offends the Constitution’s plain 
words protecting a person from being placed “twice . . . in jeopardy of life or limb” for the 
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that under the American Constitution, federal and state governments 
are but two expressions of a single and sovereign people.138  For 
Justice Gorsuch, today’s Court invokes federalism not to protect 
individual liberty but to threaten it, allowing two governments to 
achieve together an objective denied to each.139 
Lastly, Justice Gorsuch cited support from foreign cases and 
commentaries.140  The Framers to the Constitution compared the 
relationship between Wales, Scotland, and England to their vision of 
the relationship between the national government and the States, as 
prosecutions in one of these countries barred subsequent prosecutions 
for the same offense in the others.141  Moreover, Justice Gorsuch’s 
dissent emphasized foreign countries’ disallowance of successive 
prosecutions by different sovereigns—even sovereigns as foreign to 
each other as England and Portugal—suggests that the American 
federal system should likewise prohibit successive prosecutions by 
federal and state governments with even greater force, given that both 
governments derive their sovereignty from the American people.142  
Although the United States allowed the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine to 
exist, Justice Gorsuch insists that the Court not follow stare decisis 
 
same offense.” Id. 
 138. Id. (“[T]he government of the Union . . . is emphatically, and truly, a government of 
the people,” and all sovereignty “emanates from them.” (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 
Wheat. 316, 404–05 (1819))). 
 139. Id. at 2000 (explaining that the Court’s example—taxation, alcohol, and 
marijuana—involve areas that the federal and state governments each may regulate 
separately under the Constitution as interpreted by this Court). 
 140. See Beak v. Tyrhwhite, 3 Mod. 194, 87 Eng. Rep. 124 (K.B., 1688) (holding that 
acquittal in a foreign country followed by an attempted second prosecution in England was 
impermissible); 2 Hawkins § 10, at 372 (“[T]hat an [a]cquittal in any Court whatsoever, 
which has a [j]urisdiction of the [c]ause, is as good a [b]ar of any subsequent [p]rosecution 
for the same [c]rime.”); H. Bathurst, Theory of Evidence 39 (“[A] final [d]etermination in a 
[c]ourt having competent [j]urisdiction is conclusive in all [c]ourts of concurrent 
[j]urisdiction.”); F. Buller, An Introduction to the Law Relative to Trials at Nisi Prius 241 (If 
A. having killed a [p]erson in Spain was there prosecuted, tried, and acquitted, and 
afterwards was indicted here in England, he might plead the [a]cquittal in Spain in [b]ar.”). 
 141. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 2001–03 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, when an English 
county indicted a defendant “for murder committed . . . in Wales,” it was barred from 
proceeding when the court learned that the defendant had already been tried and acquitted 
“of the same offense” in Wales.” (citing King v. Thomas, 1 Lev. 118 (K.B. 1664))); see also 
Her Majesty’s Advocate v. MacGregor, Ark. 49, 60 (1846) (“In 1846, the Scottish High 
Court of Justiciary declared that “if a man has been tried for theft in England, we would not 
try him again here.”); see, e.g., A. Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography 45 (2005); 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 17 (Alexander Hamilton); John Jay, An Address to the People of the 
State of New York, in Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States 84 (P. Ford ed. 
1788). 
 142. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 2002. 
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blindly.143 
IV. ANALYSIS 
In Gamble v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a crime 
under one sovereign’s law is not “the same offense” as a crime under 
the laws of another sovereign—even when those sovereigns are the 
American federal and state governments.144  The Court made the 
incorrect judgment because it inaccurately construed the federal and 
states’ sovereign powers in the United States.145  The Court’s 
reasoning was flawed in part as it incorrectly explained the 
sovereignty of foreign nations, which it used as support in upholding 
the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine.146  Both the majority and dissent give 
plausible depictions of the creation of sovereignty in the United 
States,147 yet the majority erroneously interpreted the idea of 
sovereignty and jurisdiction in international law and made those 
interpretations the “rule” for penalizing individuals under 
international law.148 
A. The Court’s Holding is Incorrect Because the Federal 
Government and the State Government are not Distinct 
Sovereigns in the United States 
By nature, the idea of sovereignty in the United States will likely 
never be resolved. There exists a deep ambiguity of sovereignty 
because the history of the United States can be interpreted in different 
ways, as evidenced by the competing interpretations between Justice 
Alito and Justice Ginsburg in Gamble.  However, the arguments for 
one overarching sovereign federal government are strong.149  The 
arguments for a sole sovereign power in the United States stems from 
various sources: (1) the notion of preemption,150 (2) the argument that 
states have power only because the federal government gave them 
permission to have such power,151 (3) the concept of territoriality,152 
 
 143. Id. at 2006 (explaining that blind obedience to stare decisis would leave this Court 
still abiding to “grotesque errors like Dred Scott v. Sandford, Plessy v. Ferguson, and 
Korematsu v. United States”). 
 144. Id. at 1963 (majority opinion). 
 145. See infra Section IV.A. 
 146. See infra Section IV.B. 
 147. See infra Section IV.A. 
 148. See infra Section IV.B. 
 149. See infra notes 151-53. 
 150. See infra note 203. 
 151. See infra note 207. 
 152. See infra note 211. 
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(4) the powers that are reserved only for the federal government such 
as those in Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the Constitution,153 and 
(5) the understanding that times have changed since the inception and 
formation of the United States.154  I will begin with the last source in 
order to explain how the view of state sovereignty started in the 
United States, and then I will examine the other four sources listed 
above in turn. 
The notion of federalism is implicit in the structure of the United 
States,155 in various State constitutions dating back to the inception of 
the states’ formation,156 and in a long list of doctrinal history.157  
Federalism is a model of government that has two separate and 
independent layers of government: (1) a national government that, at 
least in theory, has limited authority as spelled out in a Federal 
constitution; and (2) separate state and local governments for each of 
the sovereign states, each of which has more general powers as 
limited by each state’s constitution.158  Essentially, federalism is a 
question of how power, resources and responsibility should be 
divided between the federal and state governments.159  James 
Madison conceded to a system of federalism, explaining that, “Each 
State, in ratifying its [c]onstitution, is considered as a sovereign body, 
independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary 
act.”  Madison also clarified the powers of the federal government: 
“[T]he proposed government cannot be deemed a [national] one; 
since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and 
leaves to the several [s]tates a residuary and inviolable sovereignty 
over all other objects.”160 
The issue of what sovereignty means has long preceded Justice 
Alito and Justice Ginsburg’s debate.  While the dissent takes the 
position that, “The United States and its constituent States, unlike 
 
 153. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 154. See infra note 206. 
 155. See infra note 157. 
 156. See Mark A. Graber, State Constitutions as National Constitutions, 69 ARK. L. REV. 
371 (2016). 
 157. See infra notes 170-78; Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. 13 (1852); Cross v. North 
Carolina, 132 U.S. 131 (1889); Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197 (1893); Crossley v. 
California, 168 U.S. 640 (1898); Sexton v. California, 189 U.S. 13 (1903); United States v. 
Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922); Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926); Jerome v. United 
States, 318 U.S. 101 (1943); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); Bartkus v. Illinois, 
359 U.S. 121 (1959); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959). 
 158. CHRISTOPHER B. POWER, ET AL., 36 E. & MIN. L. INST. 6, § 6.02 (2015). 
 159. Id. (citing Robert V. Percival, “Symposium: Environmental Federalism: Historical 
Roots and Contemporary Models,” 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1143 (1995)). 
 160. Id. 
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foreign nations, are ‘kindred systems,’ ‘parts of ONE WHOLE,’”161 
the majority contends that although this is true, there is a difference 
between the whole and a single part.162  The truth of the matter is that 
both the majority and the dissent are correct.163  For example, three of 
the four state constitutions adopted before July 4, 1776 – New Jersey, 
New Hampshire, and South Carolina – identified the Continental 
Congress as the governing body responsible for the life and death of 
that governing charter.164  Moreover, New Hampshire and South 
Carolina drafted and approved state constitutions only after 
requesting permission and receiving a recommendation from the 
Continental Congress to do so.165  These actions point to one 
governing sovereign—the federal government, in which case Justice 
Ginsburg is correct.  However, unlike New Jersey, New Hampshire, 
and South Carolina, Virginians made no lengthy reference to the 
Continental Congress when justifying their decision to approve a new 
state constitution.166  In fact, the initial Virginia constitution referred 
to the state as a “country.”167  Given this finding, Justice Alito would 
also be correct that the people did not confer all attributes of 
sovereignty on a single government.168  In sum, the dissent and the 
majority are telling a different story about the creation of sovereignty, 
both of which explain one part that the other misses.169 
 
 161. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1990 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 82 
(A. Hamilton)). 
 162. Id. at 1968 (majority opinion); see also supra note 109. 
 163. Mark A. Graber, State Constitutions as National Constitutions, 69 ARK. L. REV. 371, 
375 (2016) (“No state constitution takes a very clear position on whether the state was an 
entirely independent sovereign that delegated certain powers to a federal union or whether 
state sovereignty was limited to certain internal matters.  All vest the state government with 
some powers associated with national sovereignty, but not with others. Most state 
constitutions refer to the Continental Congress or the United States, without clarifying the 
nature of the relationship between the state and the United States. Most state constitutions 
say nothing about the relationship between the States.”). 
 164. Id. at 378; see N.H. CONST. of 1776; N.J. CONST. of 1776. 
 165. Graber, supra note 164, at 379. 
 166. Id. at 380; see V.A. CONST. of 1776. 
 167. Graber, supra note 164, at 380. 
 168. Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1968 (2019). 
 169. Graber, supra note 164, at 390 (“No state plainly asserted that sovereignty vested 
entirely in the Continental Congress, although New Hampshire came close.  Likewise, no 
state asserted that sovereignty vested entirely within the states, although Virginia came close. 
States routinely insisted on retaining control over their internal police, but thought the 
Continental Congress empowered to make treaties.  No state declaration or instruction made 
clear whether states had delegated power over external affairs to the Continental Congress or 
whether that body had inherent powers to make treaties and determine military strategies.”); 
Id. at 423 (“The federal Constitution clearly changed the balance of power between the states 
and federal government, but the complete absence of any reference to that national 
constitution in the seven state constitutions ratified from 1789 to 1793 belies any easy claim 
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Justice Alito’s interpretation of sovereignty is inherently 
grounded in the streams of cases that created and applied the Dual 
Sovereignty Doctrine.  Several cases lead to the eventual creation of 
the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine.  In Alden v. Maine,170 the Court 
recognized that the people, by adopting the Constitution, “split the 
atom of sovereignty.”171  By “splitting the atom of sovereignty,” the 
Founders established “two orders of government, each with its own 
direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and 
obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it.”172  In 
Gregory v. Ashcroft,173 the Supreme Court emphasized that, “[U]nder 
our federal system, the states possess sovereignty concurrent with 
that of the federal government, subject only to the limitations 
imposed by the Supremacy Clause.”174  Justice O’Connor pointed out 
that the Court had described the constitutional scheme of dual 
sovereigns over 120 years ago.175  The Constitution created a federal 
government of limited powers and those powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, 
are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.176  Moreover, 
Justice Alito points out that cases as early as McCulloch v. 
Maryland177 admitted to a system of dual sovereignty.178 
The Court truly began setting the doctrine’s foundation in its 
1820 opinion Houston v. Moore.179  Houston challenged his state 
court conviction on the ground that his offense violated the laws of 
the United States therefore, he could only be punished under federal 
 
that a consensus had formed on the sovereign status of states.”). 
 170. 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 171. Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1968 (2019) (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 
706, 751 (1999)). 
 172. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751 (1999) (citing Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504, 
n. 17 (1999)). 
 173. 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
 174. Id. at 457 (citing Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990)). 
 175. Id. (“The people of each [s]tate compose a [s]tate, having its own government, and 
endowed with all the functions essential to separate and independent existence . . . The 
Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to the indestructible Union, composed of 
indestructible [s]tates.” (quoting Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725 (1869))). 
 176. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. X). 
 177. 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
 178. Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1968 (2019) (“Chief Justice Marshall 
distinguished precisely between “the people of a State” and “[t]he people of all the States,” 
(citing 17 U.S. at 428, 435); between the “sovereignty which the people of a single state 
possess” and the sovereign powers “conferred by the people of the United States on the 
government of the Union,” (citing 17 U.S. at 429–30); and thus between “the action of a 
part” and “the action of the whole,” (citing 17 U.S. at 435–36)). 
 179. 18 U.S. 1 (1820). 
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laws, and cannot be punished under the laws of his own State.”180  
The Court rejected this argument, explaining that, “Every citizen of a 
state owes a double allegiance; he enjoys the protection and 
participates in the government of both the State and the United 
States.”181  To explain the presence of dual sovereignty, the Court 
gave the example of a highway mail robbery: this would be 
recognized as a highway robbery under state laws and a federal 
offense under U.S. law.182 
In 1847, the Court affirmed the notion of dual sovereignty in 
Fox v. Ohio.183  The defendant challenged her state conviction for 
passing counterfeit coin on the grounds that only the federal 
government had jurisdiction over that offense.184  The court dismissed 
the challenge by distinguishing counterfeiting, which was an offense 
exclusively within the power of the Congress to proscribe, and 
passing counterfeit coin, which was a fraud punishable under state 
law.185  Just three years later in United States v. Marigold,186 the Court 
affirmed Fox’s concurrent jurisdiction holding, explaining that the 
states and Congress each had independent jurisdiction to prosecute 
and punish uttering false currency.187 
Just two years later, Moore v. Illinois188 solidified the 
jurisdictional foundation laid by Houston, Fox and Marigold.  The 
defendant challenged his state conviction under an Illinois law 
outlawing harboring fugitive slaves, claiming that such conviction 
resulted in double jeopardy since the federal government already 
prosecuted him under the Fugitive Slave Act.189  In response to the 
double jeopardy challenge, the Court announced the Dual 
Sovereignty Doctrine.190 
 
 180. Id. at 33. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 34. 
 183. 46 U.S. 410 (1847). 
 184. Id. at 433 (insisting that the Ohio statute is repugnant to the fifth and sixth clauses of 
the eight section of the first article of the [C]onstitution, which invest Congress with the 
power to coin money, regulate the value thereof and of foreign coin, and to provide for the 
punishment of counterfeiting the current coin of the United States). 
 185. Id. 
 186. 50 U.S. 560 (1850). 
 187. Id. at 569–70. 
 188. 55 U.S. 13 (1852). 
 189. Id. at 14, 17. 
 190. Id. at 19–20 (“An offense, in its legal signification, means the transgression of a 
law. . . . Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State or territory.  He may be 
said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns. And may be liable to punishment for an infraction 
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The first true and full application of the Dual Sovereignty 
Doctrine came seventy years later in United States v. Lanza.191  The 
Court explained that each state and Congress may exercise an 
independent judgment in selecting and shaping measures to enforce 
their own laws, whereby the laws adopted by Congress become laws 
of the United States and the laws adopted by a State become laws of 
that State.”192  In its first true application of the Doctrine, the Court 
justified its holding by explicitly using independent prescriptive 
jurisdiction to determine offenses.193 
Doctrinal history thus far has overwhelmingly supported Justice 
Alito’s explanation of sovereignty in the United States.  Only in 
particular cases will the Court not apply the Dual Sovereignty 
Doctrine and rule that the Double Jeopardy clause applies to bar 
successive prosecutions.  One instance where the double jeopardy 
clause would apply to bar a successive federal prosecution is when 
state courts are empowered to apply United States federal law, i.e., 
“where jurisdiction is vested in the State Courts by statutory 
provisions of the United States.”194 
The Court has also been unwilling to find a dual sovereignty 
exception to double jeopardy where it has stressed the absence of an 
independent prescriptive jurisdiction by each prosecuting entity, and 
has emphasized that both entities draw their jurisdiction from the 
same lawgiving “source.”195  For example, in Grafton v. United 
States,196 the Court held that a homicide prosecution by military court 
martial foreclosed a successive prosecution for the same homicide by 
the civil justice system in the then-U.S. territory of the Philippines.  
In doing so, the Court explained that if a person is tried in a tribunal 
that gets its jurisdiction and authority from the United States, and is 
acquitted or convicted, he cannot be tried again for the same offense 
in another tribunal that gets its jurisdiction and authority from the 
 
of the laws of either.  The same act may be an offense or transgression of the laws of both 
. . . . That either or both may (if they see fit) punish such an offender, cannot be doubted.  
Yet it cannot be truly averred that the offender has been twice punished for the same offense; 
but only that by one act he has committed two offenses, for each of which he is justly 
punishable.  He could not plead the punishment in one in bar to a conviction by the other.”). 
 191. 260 U.S. 377 (1922); see supra pp. 10–11. 
 192. 260 U.S. at 381. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. 1, 35 (1820). 
 195. Anthony J. Colangelo, Double Jeopardy and Multiple Sovereigns: A Jurisdictional 
Theory, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 769, 788 (2009). 
 196. 206 U.S. 333, 351 (1909). 
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United States.”197  The court martial prosecuted Grafton for homicide 
as defined by the Penal Code of the Philippines and because he 
applied the civil law definition of homicide, the Court found that a 
successive civil court prosecution was “for the identical offense.”198 
While Justice Ginsburg correctly points out one view of 
sovereignty, her view does not make Justice Alito’s view any less 
incorrect as far as the history of the United States concerns.   Both the 
majority and the dissent accurately present valid theories of the 
creation of sovereignty—one being a federalism theory of 
sovereignty and the other a liberty theory of sovereignty (that 
sovereignty resides with the people and the state and federal 
government are part of one whole).  The theories of how sovereignty 
was created in the United States can co-exist since there has yet to be 
one absolute explanation of the creation of sovereignty, evidenced 
heavily by the different paths states took to becoming independent.199  
Some states took a liberty approach and others a federalist approach; 
however, their reasoning for each specific path remains unknown.200 
Although the notion of sovereignty during the inception of the 
United States led to the creation and subsequent application of the 
Dual Sovereignty Doctrine as seen above, the view and 
understanding of sovereignty in the United States has changed 
significantly.  The idea of sovereignty was revolutionized through 
concepts of preemption, territoriality and residual sovereignty.  While 
the states in the United States retain significantly more internal 
autonomy than other federalist countries around the world, the states 
are still subservient to the federal government.201  The Supremacy 
Clause is a clause within Article IV202 of the United States 
Constitution, which dictates that federal law is the “supreme law of 
the land.”203  This means that judges in every state must follow the 
Constitution, laws, and treaties of the federal government in matters 
 
 197. Id. at 352. 
 198. Id. at 349. Since the military court marital and the territorial civil court derived 
jurisdiction from the United States government, and thus necessarily prosecuted for a crime 
against the laws of the United States, “a second trial of the accused for that crime in the same 
or another court, civil or military, of the same government” violated double jeopardy. Id. at 
352. 
 199. See Mark A. Graber, State Constitutions as National Constitutions, 69 ARK. L. REV. 
371, 387–89 (2016) (“The different paths states took to independence in 1776 suggest that 
states disputed the location of sovereignty in the Americas.”). 
 200. Id. at 397. 
 201. See U.S. CONST. Article VI. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
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that are directly or indirectly within the government’s control.  Under 
the doctrine of preemption, which is based on the Supremacy Clause, 
federal law preempts state law even when the laws conflict.  Thus, a 
federal court may require a state to stop certain behavior it believes 
interferes with, or is in conflict with, federal law.  The notion of 
preemption cedes to the premise of one overarching sovereign power 
in the United States. 
Regardless of the different paths that states took to becoming 
independent, the truth is that the states no longer retain the 
sovereignty that Justice Alito’s originalist view would have one 
believe.  States are no longer viewed as sovereign but rather they are 
autonomous agents.204  While Justice Alito essentially attempts to 
argue that states are still sovereign because at one point states were 
sovereign, that is simply not the case anymore.  States today cannot 
delegate war or send troops to war because that power is reserved 
solely for Congress.205  Moreover, powers such as coining money, 
regulating interstate and foreign commerce, regulating the mail, 
declaring armies, conducting foreign affairs, establishing inferior 
courts and establishing rules of naturalization are all exclusive 
powers of the federal government.206  Any power not listed to the 
federal government is left to the states or the people by the Tenth 
Amendment, which likens states to more of autonomous agents rather 
than sovereign agents.207  To the extent that there are dual sovereigns, 
the sovereignty is between the states, such as in Heath v. Alabama, 
but not so much between the state and federal governments.  Missouri 
v. Holland further settled the notion of dual sovereignty, explaining 
that the civil war settled that states at best retained residual 
sovereignty.208  Sovereignty may rest in the people but the federal 
government ultimately represents the people.209  In addition to the 
concepts of preemption and residual sovereignty, the concept of 
territoriality also works to eradicate the idea of dual sovereignty.  In 
the international sphere, we generally define nation states as actors 
 
 204. See infra note 207. 
 205. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 206. The relationship between the states and the federal government, KHAN ACADEMY, 
(last visited Apr. 29, 2020) https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/us-government-and-
civics/us-gov-foundations/us-gov-relationship-between-the-states-and-the-federal-
government/a/relationship-between-the-states-and-the-federal-government-article. 
 207. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 208. See infra notes 256-57. 
 209. Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1999 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he government of the Union . . . is emphatically, and truly, a government of the 
people,” and all sovereignty “emanates from them.” (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 
316, 404–05 (1819))). 
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that have power over their own territory,210 whereas states in the 
United States share territory with the federal government and the 
federal government has supreme access to that territory.211  These 
concepts of preemption, territoriality and residual sovereignty give 
way to the notion of one supreme and overarching sovereign in the 
United States: the federal government. 
B. The Court Improperly Used an International Analogy as 
Support by Incorrectly Explaining the Notion of 
Jurisdiction in the International Sphere 
Before analyzing the misplaced international analogies used by 
Justice Alito, it is worth noting briefly the great irony in Gamble: that 
Justice Alito has come to take great care for international law while 
Justice Ginsburg, a scholar and advocate for international law and 
human rights, has taken a backseat to the use of international law and 
alternatively, advocates for its irrelevance in the case at hand.  Justice 
Alito misuses two international examples for support in Gamble v. 
United States.  First—If a United States national was murdered in 
another country, that country could rightfully seek to punish the killer 
for committing an act of violence within its territory.212  Justice Alito 
argues that customary international law allows the concurrent 
exercise of United States jurisdiction since the murder of a United 
States national is also an offense to the United States, which in turn, 
supports his argument that the killing of an American abroad is a 
federal offense that can be prosecuted in American courts.213  
Second—crimes that might do harm to the United States’ national 
security or foreign relations can be punished by the other country and 
the United States.214  The reason for this is because acts such as 
terrorism and bombings are covered under international jurisdiction, 
which requires no nexus to establish jurisdiction.215 
Justice Alito mischaracterized the international examples based 
on the concept of jurisdiction in the international sphere.  There are 
 
 210. What is a “State”?, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, https://www.globalpolicy.org/nations-
a-states/what-is-a-state.html (“A state is the means of rule over a defined or “sovereign” 
territory.”). 
 211. Rob Natelson, What Does the Constitution Say About Federal Land Ownership?, 
INDEPENDENCE INSTITUTE (Feb. 6, 2016), https://i2i.org/what-does-the-constitution-say-
about-federal-land-ownership/. 
 212. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1967 (explaining that the foreign country’s interest lies in 
protecting the peace in that territory rather than protecting the American specifically). 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(b) (bombings)). 
 215. See infra notes 237-38. 
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two kinds of prescriptive jurisdiction in international law—“national 
jurisdiction” and “international jurisdiction.”216  National jurisdiction 
derives from “independent entitlements of each individual state vis-à-
vis other states in the international system to make and apply its own 
law—principally, from entitlements over national territory and 
persons.”217  International jurisdiction derives from “a state’s shared 
entitlement – along with all other states as members of the 
international system – to enforce international law.”218  These two 
kinds of jurisdictions ultimately represent two different kinds of 
“sovereigns” for double jeopardy purposes—one national and the 
other international.219 
Under all of the foregoing principles, a state requires a nexus to 
the first state’s national entitlements.220  When discussing “national 
jurisdiction,” State A has jurisdiction over State A territory because of 
State A’s national entitlement, as recognized by international law, 
over its territory.221  A state is entitled to exercise jurisdiction over its 
territory when the activity comes in reach of a State’s subjective 
territoriality222 (activity that occurs, even in part, within its territory) 
or objective territoriality223 (activity that does not occur but has an 
effect within its territory).  Moreover, a state can claim jurisdiction 
over activity that involves its nationals.224  The latter exercise of 
jurisdiction is critical to understand given Justice Alito’s use of 
international support.  “Where the acts in question are committed by 
a state’s nationals, the state may claim active personality jurisdiction.  
And where the acts victimize a state’s nationals, the state may claim 
passive personality jurisdiction.”225  Additionally, under the 
protective principle, a state may claim jurisdiction over activity that 
is directed against the state’s security and/or its ability to carry out 
 
 216. Colangelo, supra note 195, at 790. 
 217. Id. (“We might think of national courts exercising national jurisdiction and applying 
national law in the international system as roughly analogous to the United States state 
courts applying their own state’s law in the United States federal system.”). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 793 (“For instance, absent some nexus, Germany may not apply its racial hate 
speech laws to speech by United States nationals, speaking only in the United States and 
having no connection to Germany.” (citing Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International 
Law, 48 HARV. INT’L L. J. 121, 169–75 (2007))). 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 794 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS: SELECTED TOPICS 
IN TREATIES, JURISDICTION, AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY § 402(1)(a) (2018)). 
 223. Id. (citing § 402(1)(c)). 
 224. Id. (citing § 402(2)). 
 225. Id. (citing § 402 (2) cmt. g.). 
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official state functions.226 
While one might think that the passive personality principle 
justifies Justice Alito’s example of the murder of a United States 
national, that is incorrect.  Passive personality principle exists in 
international law but it does not exist in United States domestic 
law.227  Passive personality principle does not give American states 
jurisdiction, because if that were so, then the United States would be 
prosecuting foreign nationals on their own territory.  If a United 
States citizen is murdered in a foreign country, the United States 
cannot extend its laws to prosecute the murderer unless the United 
States asserts some specific jurisdictional authority to do so.  In 
essence, the United States can follow United States murderers in 
foreign countries, but not United States murder victims.  For 
example, if a United States national is killed in France, the United 
States cannot enforce its own murder statute in France under 
international law.228  The one exception to this is the crime of 
terrorism or crimes known as jus cogens – crimes against humanity, 
both of which are recognized as a universal jurisdictional offense.229 
The other type of jurisdiction is international jurisdiction.  This 
type of jurisdiction requires no nexus at all because the basis is 
universal jurisdiction.230  “The very commission of certain crimes 
denominated universal under international law engenders jurisdiction 
for all states irrespective of where the crimes occur or which state’s 
nationals are involved.”231  No nexus is required because states have 
jurisdictional power purely from the international legal system’s 
interest in suppressing certain international crimes no matter where 
they occur and whom they involve, thereby having the states act as 
decentralized enforcement vehicles for the international legal 
 
 226. Id. (citing §402 (3)). 
 227. Hariharan Kumar, Passive Personality Principle: An Overview, ACADEMIKE (Feb. 6, 
2015), https://www.lawctopus.com/academike/passive-personality-principle-overview/ 
(“Under the passive personality (or victim) theory, a State has prescriptive jurisdiction over 
anyone anywhere who injures its nationals. Jurisdiction is based on the nationality of the 
victim.  The United States however does not recognize this theory generally - despite its 
recitation in certain cases – and there is a doubt whether more than handful of other States 
actually accepts it as a valid principle of customary international law.”). 
 228. See supra note 227. 
 229. See infra notes 237-38. 
 230. Colangelo, supra note 195, at 794. 
 231. Id. (“Thus while a state may not, without a nexus to its national entitlements, extend 
its national prescriptive reach into the territories of other states, international law extends 
everywhere and without limitation the international prohibition on universal crimes.” (citing 
Anthony J. Colangelo, The Legal Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 149 
(2007))). 
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system.232 
Justice Alito’s two prime uses of international support are 
deceptive, because in each case, Justice Alito has explicitly either 
ignored the concept of jurisdiction in international law or taken an 
exception under international law and made it the rule by using 
crimes that are deemed to be covered by universal jurisdiction.233  In 
Justice Alito’s first example, the murder of a United States national in 
a foreign country bestows jurisdiction on the foreign country and the 
United States.234  However, that has turned out to be explicitly 
incorrect by virtue of the lack of a passive personality principle in 
United States domestic law.235  In Justice Alito’s second example, he 
cites 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(b), which grants the United States 
jurisdiction when its own national security or foreign relations are 
threatened.236  In reality, the United States would have jurisdiction in 
cases involving weapons of mass destruction or crimes of terrorism 
because international law recognizes terrorism as a universal 
jurisdictional offense.237  “It is the international nature of the crime – 
its very substance and definition under international law – that gives 
rise to jurisdiction for all states.”238  Ironically enough, it is important 
to consider that the issue at hand in Gamble is a charge of possession 
of a firearm.  Therefore, for Justice Alito to use an analogy of 
terrorism in the international sphere to support his argument about a 
case concerning possession of a firearm is far-fetched and misplaced 
at best.  Justice Alito’s analysis of sovereignty is also ironic in the 
respect that as a conservative, he is supporting the idea of splitting 
sovereignty between two governments rather than advocating for 
sovereignty lying with the people.  These ironies give support to the 
idea that dual sovereignty in the United States is a legal fiction. 
Justice Alito misleads individuals to believe that regardless of 
the crime that occurs in one nation, the other foreign nation can get 
jurisdiction as well by handpicking those certain crimes that fall 
under international law to support his idea of sovereignty in the 
international sphere.  In international law, sovereignty is not used as a 
 
 232. Id. at 797. 
 233. See infra note 237. 
 234. See supra note 213. 
 235. See supra note 227. 
 236. 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(b) (bombings). 
 237. Colangelo, supra note 195, at 794 (“The category of universal crime . . . is now 
generally considered to include serious international human rights and humanitarian law 
violations like genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, torture, and most recently, 
certain crimes of terrorism.”). 
 238. Id. 
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power mechanism, but rather as a limitation on power for all states.239  
For example, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
limits subsequent prosecutions after a county has already prosecuted 
that individual, understanding the concerns of fairness to the accused, 
individual human rights, and the protection of the integrity of the 
judicial system.240  This statute in international law directly 
contradicts Justice Alito’s application and view of sovereignty in the 
international sphere.  Justice Alito distorted the view of sovereignty 
in the international sphere by using it as a power mechanism for 
states, which is exactly the unintended and antithetical consequence 
of the purpose of sovereignty in international law.241  In sum, his use 
of international support in Gamble is deceptive and inaccurate. 
C. Sovereignty v. Autonomy 
Justice Alito’s opinion inherently imputes an investigation into 
the states’ sovereign powers.  The 10th Amendment errs on the side of 
states being autonomous.242  Per the 10th Amendments reading, the 
states retain a residual sovereignty—they receive all the powers that 
are left over from the federal government and not delegated 
specifically to the federal government.243  However, Justice Alito’s 
opinion errs on the side of states being sovereign rather than being 
autonomous.244  Justice Alito uses Heath v. Alabama245 to strengthen 
his view of state sovereignty. Heath had hired two men in Georgia to 
kidnap and kill his wife, which they did—kidnapping her in Alabama 
and killing her in Georgia.246  He was prosecuted for homicide in 
Georgia and pleaded guilty in exchange for a life sentence to avoid 
 
 239. See infra note 241. 
 240. Lorraine Finlay, Does the International Criminal Court Protect against Double 
Jeopardy: An Analysis of Article 20 of the Rome Statute, 
15 U. C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 221, 226 (2009).  Article 20 of the Rome Statute, in 
part, states: Except as provided in this Statute, no person shall be tried before the Court with 
respect to conduct which formed the basis of crimes for which the person has been convicted 
or acquitted by the Court. No person shall be tried by another court for a crime referred to in 
article 5 for which that person has already been convicted or acquitted by the Court.  No 
person who has been tried by another court for conduct also proscribed under article 6, 7, or 
8 shall be tried by the Court with respect to the same conduct unless [. . . ]. 
 241. Id. 
 242. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people.”). 
 243. See supra notes 207, 242. 
 244. See supra note 97. 
 245. Heath, 474 U.S. 82 (1985). 
 246. Id. at 83–84. 
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the death penalty.247  Alabama then prosecuted him for the same 
homicide, convicting him and sentencing him to death.248  Heath 
argued to the Supreme Court that almost all of the activity relating to 
the crime took place in Georgia, thus Alabama overreached its 
constitutional authority to exercise jurisdiction over the events that 
occurred in Georgia.249  The United States Supreme Court agreed with 
the Alabama Supreme Court that, “[i]f for double jeopardy purposes, 
Alabama is considered to be a sovereign entity vis-à-vis the federal 
government then surely it is a sovereign entity vis-à-vis the State of 
Georgia.”250  The Court further explained that Heath’s acts violated 
the “peace and dignity” of Georgia and Alabama, two separate 
sovereigns, by breaking the laws of each.251  Thus he had committed 
two distinct offenses.252 
However, Justice Alito’s view of state sovereignty is still 
undermined by cases such as Missouri v. Holland.253  In Missouri, the 
United States entered a treaty with Great Britain to prohibit the 
killing of migratory birds that traveled between the United States and 
Canada, since the birds were in danger of extinction.254  Missouri 
argued that the 10th Amendment prohibits the United States from 
exercising powers that are reserved to the States since the power to 
prohibit the killing of migratory birds was not delegated to the United 
States.255  However, the Court held that because Article 2, Section 2 
expressly grants the United States the power to make treaties and 
Article 6 guarantees that treaties made under the authority of the 
United States are declared the supreme law of the land in cases where 
state law conflicts, the fact that Missouri claims they can regulate 
migratory birds is not enough to override the overarching power of 
Article 6.256  Missouri in essence eradicates state sovereignty by 
explaining that all acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land 
whenever states’ law conflicts, regardless of what powers were 
reserved or delegated to the states.257  What Missouri further 
 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 85–86. 
 249. Id. at 85–87. 
 250. Id. at 86 (citing Ex Parte Heath, 455 So. 2d 905, 906 (Ala. 1984)). 
 251. Id. at 88 (citing United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922)). 
 252. Id. 
 253. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
 254. Id. at 431–32. 
 255. Id. at 432 (“It is said that a treaty cannot be valid if it infringes the Constitution”). 
 256. Id. (“As most of the laws of the United States are carried out within the States and as 
many of them deal with matters which in the silence of such laws the State might regulate, 
such general grounds are not enough to support Missouri’s claim”). 
 257. Id. at 433. 
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emphasizes is the concept of preemption.258 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Gamble v. United States, the Court upheld the Dual 
Sovereignty Doctrine, explaining that a state may prosecute a 
defendant under state law even if the federal government has 
prosecuted him for the same conduct under a federal statute, and the 
reverse.259  The Court incorrectly decided the case because although 
both, Justice Alito and Justice Ginsburg argue a valid theory of the 
creation of sovereignty in the United States, Justice Ginsburg’s 
picture of sovereignty is more consistent with the evolution of 
sovereignty today.  Moreover, Justice Alito incorrectly explained the 
meaning of sovereignty in the international sphere and how 
international law perceives sovereignty. 
Moving forward, to better protect American citizen’s rights 
against Double Jeopardy, the federal government should be 
encouraged to adhere to the Petite Policy260 when cases of potential 
double jeopardy arise.  The policy constructs a barrier against 
successive federal prosecutions where the defendant has already been 
tried in state court for the same criminal activity.261  The Department 
of Justice will only pursue a federal prosecution “based on 
substantially the same act(s) or transaction(s)” previously prosecuted 
in state court if the first prosecution left a “substantial federal interest 
demonstrably unvindicated.”262  The purpose of the Petite Policy is to 
institutionalize deference to prior prosecutions for the same activity 
by other sovereigns but to also protect defendants from having to 
endure multiple prosecutions unless those interests are compelling.263  
This policy exists to protect the sovereign’s interests while not 




 258. U.S. CONST. art. VI; Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984) 
(explaining when state law can be preempted by federal law); see supra note 207. 
 259. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1964. SHORT CITE – DONE. 
 260. The policy was named after Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960). 
 261. The policy applied whenever there has been a prior state or federal prosecution 
resulting in an acquittal, a conviction, including one resulting from a plea agreement, or a 
dismissal or other termination of the case on the merits after jeopardy has attached. Dept. of 
Justice, U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, Title 9: Criminal Resource Manual § 9-2.031(C) (Dual and 
Successive Prosecution Policy (“Petite Policy”)). 
 262. Id. at § 9-2.031(A); Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1995 (J. Ginsburg, dissenting).. 
 263. Id. at §9-2.031(A). 
